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Most literature addressing the structure of corporate ownership compares 
dispersed  ownership (DO) with  a controlled structure (CS) in which  a 
large blockholder owns a majority or large plurality of a company’s shares. 
This paper, by contrast, examines an ownership structure in which a share- 
holder exercises control while retaining only a small fraction of the equity 
claims on a company’s cash flows. Such a radical separation of control 
and cash-flow rights can occur in three principal ways: through dual class 
share structures, stock pyramids, and cross-ownership ties. Regardless of 
how it arises, we  term  this pattern  of  ownership a controlling-minority 
sfructure (CMS) because it permits a shareholder to control a firm while 
holding only a fraction of  its equity. The CMS structure resembles CS 
insofar as it insulates controllers from the market for corporate control, 
but it resembles DO insofar as it places corporate control in the hands of 
an insider who holds a small fraction of the firm’s cash-flow rights. Thus, 
CMS threatens to combine the incentive problems associated with both 
the CS and the DO ownership in a single ownership structure. 
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CMS structures are common outside the United States, particularly in 
countries whose economies are dominated by family-controlled conglom- 
erates.' Because these structures can radically distort their controllers' in- 
centives, however, they put great pressure on nonelectoral mechanisms of 
corporate governance, ranging from legal protections for minority share- 
holders to reputational constraints on controlling families. For the same 
reason, CMS structures have recently come under close political and mar- 
ket scrutiny in many countries. The time is ripe, therefore, for an analysis 
of the governance and incentive features of these structures. 
We  start in section  10.1 by  analyzing the ways in which the three ar- 
rangements under consideration-stock  pyramids, cross-ownership struc- 
tures, and dual class equity structures-produce  a separation of control 
from cash-flow rights. Indeed, we  show how corporate planners can use 
such arrangements to produce any degree of separation that is desired. 
We  illustrate our analysis with examples of CMS structures drawn from 
companies around the world. 
Section 10.2 analyzes the agency costs of CMS structures. In this sec- 
tion, we  show how CMS structures distort the decisions that controllers 
make with respect to firm size, choice of projects, and transfers of control. 
Our central contribution here is to highlight the potentially large agency 
costs that such structures involve. We demonstrate that the agency costs 
imposed  by  controlling  shareholders  who have a small minority  of the 
cash-flow rights in their companies can be an order of magnitude larger 
than those imposed by  controlling shareholders who hold a majority  of 
the cash-flow rights. This is because,  as the size of cash-flow rights held 
decreases, the size of agency costs increases, not linearly, but rather at a 
sharply increasing rate. 
Section 10.3 compares the agency costs of CMS structures with those 
of debt under circumstances of extreme leverage. Although leverage also 
separates cash flow from control rights, we argue that the agency costs of 
debt may well be less troublesome than those of CMS structures. The sta- 
tus of CMS noncontrolling shareholders compares poorly to that of debt- 
holders, who are protected  by  priority  rights  and protective covenants. 
The contrast is so marked that a CMS controller might plausibly  incur 
debt just to signal her willingness to limit  the agency costs that  she is 
prepared to impose. 
Our analysis of the agency costs of CMS structures raises many issues 
that call for further empirical and theoretical  study. In section  10.4, we 
put forward the agenda of research that is warranted by our findings con- 
cerning the agency costs of CMS structures. 
1. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), who conduct a comprehensive survey 
of ownership structures around the world, demonstrate that CMS structures, and particu- 
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10.1  Mechanisms of Separating Cash Flow and Control 
In this section, we  describe the three basic mechanisms that permit a 
company’s  controller  to retain  only a minority  of  the cash-flow  rights 
attached to the firm’s equity: differential voting rights structures, pyramid 
structures,  and cross-ownership  structures.  Although  a minority  share- 
holder often exercises a form of working control when a firm’s remaining 
shares are dispersed, we are not concerned with such contingent forms of 
control here. Instead, we  consider structures in which a minority share- 
holder possesses entrenched control that is wholly insulated from any take- 
over threat. Each of the three basic CMS forms firmly entrenches minority 
control, as do hybrids of these forms that are best analyzed in terms of 
the basic structures. In each case, the CMS form can be used in principle 
to separate cash-flow rights from control rights to any extent desired. We 
denote the degree of separation induced by a CMS structure between con- 
trol and cash-flow rights by a,  which represents the fraction of the firm’s 
equity cash-flow rights held by the controlling-minority shareholder. 
10.1.1  Differential Voting Rights 
The most straightforward CMS form is a single firm that has issued two 
or more classes of stock with  differential  voting rights.  Indeed, such a 
multiclass equity structure is the only CMS form that does not depend on 
the creation of multiple firms. 
The Separation of Cash-Flow and Control Rights 
Calibrating the separation of cash-flow and control rights in a dual class 
equity  structure is  child’s play. A planner  can simply  attach all voting 
rights to the fraction cx of shares that are assigned to the controller while 
attaching no voting rights to the remaining shares that are distributed to 
the public or other shareholders.2 
The Incidence of Differential Voting Rights 
Despite its simplicity, however, dual class equity is not the most com- 
mon CMS structure. One reason may be that the corporate law of some 
jurisdictions  restricts both the voting  ratio between  high-  and low-vote 
shares and the numerical ratio between high- and low-vote shares that a 
firm is permitted to issue. These restrictions  implicitly mandate a lower 
bound on the size of a. Yet  such legal restrictions cannot wholly explain 
the lagging popularity of differential voting rights. As La Porta, Lopez- 
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1 999) observe, even in jurisdictions  where firms 
2. In their sample of dual class firms, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) found that insiders 
held a median of 56.9 percent of the voting rights but only 24 percent of the common stock 
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often have stock with differential voting rights, CMS companies typically 
do  not reduce the fraction of controller ownership a to the legal minimum. 
Dual class voting  structures are particularly  common in Sweden and 
South Africa. The most prominent  Swedish example is the Wallenberg 
group, which controls companies whose stock constitutes about 40 per- 
cent of the listed shares on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Family trusts 
hold 40 percent of the voting rights but only about 20 percent of the equity 
in the group’s principal holding company, Investor (if allied investors are 
included, these  percentages  increase to 65 percent  of  the votes  and 43 
percent of the equity, respectively). In turn, Investor controls a large num- 
ber of  operating companies.  For example,  it holds  about 95 percent  of 
the votes but less than 7 percent  of  the equity in  Electrolux,  the large 
manufacturer of household appliances, and it holds 40 percent of the votes 
but less than 4 percent of the equity in Ericsson Telefon, a large telecom 
(“Storming the Citadel” 1990). In South Africa, dual class equity is also 
becoming widely accepted  (although it remains less popular  than CMS 
pyramids). Companies have been permitted to list low-vote “N shares” on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange since 1995. 
10.1.2  Pyramids 
A CMS firm can be established with a single class of stock by pyramid- 
ing corporate structures.  In a pyramid  of two companies, a controlling- 
minority shareholder holds a controlling stake in a holding company that, 
in turn, holds a controlling  stake in an operating company.  In a three- 
tier pyramid, the primary holding company controls a second-tier holding 
company that in turn controls the operating company. 
The Separation of Cash-Flow and Control Rights 
To see the extent of separation of cash-flow and voting rights in a pyra- 
mid structure, consider the simple case of a sequence of IZ 2 2 companies, 
in which the controller holds a fraction s, of the shares in company 1, com- 
pany  1 holds a fraction s,  of the shares in company 2, and so on. In this 
example, the nonpaper assets will be placed in company n. 
As long as s, 2 ‘/2,  i = 1, . . . ,  n, the controller exercises formal control 
over the assets. As to cash-flow rights, the controller holds a fraction 
PROPOSITION  1. For any fraction a,  however small, there is a pyramid that 
permits a controller to control a company>  assets completely without holding 
more than a of the companyk  cash--ow rights.  This follows from the fact 
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can become as low as desired. 
In the boundary case in which the controller holds 50 percent of voting 
rights at each level of a pyramid (the minimum necessary for formal con- 
trol), ci  = (0.5)”. To  take a concrete example of how rapidly pyramiding 
separates equity from control, consider a three-level pyramid with s,  = 
0.50 at each level. Here, the minority investor controls the firm with only 
12.5 percent of its cash-flow rights. 
The Incidence of Pyramid Structures 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) find that pyramids are 
the most commonly used mechanism for concentrating control in a CMS 
structure. Pyramiding is quite common in Asian countries (see Claessens 
et al. 1999) as well as in some European countries (see, eg,  Bianchi, Bi- 
anco, and Enriques 1997; and Holmen and Hogfeldt 1999). One example 
of a well-known pyramid is the Li Ka-shing group, operating out of Hong 
Kong. The Li Ka-shing family operates through the Cheung Kong public 
company, in which it has a 35 percent interest (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer 1999). Cheung Kong, in turn, has a 44 percent interest in its 
main operating company, Hutcheson Wampoa. Hutcheson Wampoa owns 
Cavendish International, which is the holding company for Hong Kong 
Electric (Weidenbaum  1996). A second, Indian example is  the Gondrej 
family, which holds, through the privately held Gondrej and Boyce Manu- 
facturing Company, 67 percent of the publicly traded Godrej Soaps (which 
is listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange). In turn, Godrej Soaps owns 65 
percent of  Godrej Agrovet (agriculture) and, together with the Godrej 
group, 65 percent of Godrej Foods (food processing) (Morais 1998). 
10.1.3  Cross-Ownership 
In contrast to pyramids, companies in cross-ownership structures are 
linked by horizontal cross-holdings of shares that reinforce and entrench 
the power of central controllers. Thus, cross-holding structures differ from 
pyramids chiefly in that the voting rights used to control a group remain 
distributed over the entire group rather than concentrated in the hands of 
a single company or shareholder. 
The Separation of Cash-Flow and Control Rights 
To  clarify the relation between cross-holdings and control, consider a 
group of n companies in a cross-holding structure. Let us denote by sl,  the 
fraction of company i’s shares that are held by company  j.  And suppose that 
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Assuming that, for each i, the controller maintains 
the controller completely controls the assets of all n companies. However, 
the controller might hold only a small fraction of the cash-flow rights in 
these companies. The simplest example of a symmetrical case is a control- 
ler who holds  identical stakes s in two companies with identical cross- 
holdings h in the other, such that s + h > l/2  (i.e., the controller’s control 
in both companies is entrenched). In this case, the controller’s fraction of 
the cash-flow rights is the ratio cfits  direct holding s over the total fraction 
of shares that is not cross-held (1 -  h): 
PROPOSITION  2. For  any a, however small,  it  is possible  to construct  a 
cross-ownership structure such that the controller will have complete control 
over the assets but no more than a  fraction a of the cashjow  from the assets. 
PROOF.  In the symmetrical  two-company  structure considered  above, 
this can be accomplished by choosing s and h such that s + h 2 ‘/2 and 
s/(l -  h)  gives the desired a.  These conditions can be satisfied by setting 
s equal to I/2a( 1 -  a)  and by setting h equal to I/2[1  -  a(  1 -  a)].  Although 
we  demonstrate this proposition only for the case of a symmetrical two- 
company structure, cross-ownership ties yielding a desired a  can be con- 
structed for nonsymmetrical or multicompany structures as well. 
The Incidence of Cross-Holding Structures 
Ethnic Chinese families employ cross-holdings as well as pyramids to 
secure  control  of  their  business  groups.  Cross-holdings  are popular in 
Asia,  it is  said, because  they  make  the locus of  control  over company 
groups less transparent (Weidenbaum  1996). A prominent example is the 
vast Chareon Pokphand group (CP), based in Thailand, which owns di- 
rectly 33 percent of CP  Feedmill (agribusiness and some real estate, retail- 
ing, manufacturing, and telecom), 2 percent of CP Northeastern (agribusi- 
ness), and 9 percent of Bangkok Agro-Industrial (agribusiness). But CP 
Feedmill owns 57 percent of Northeastern. CP  Feedmill also owns 60 per- 
cent of Bangkok Agro-Industrial, and CP Northeastern owns 3 percent 
of Bangkok Agro-Industrial. Bangkok Agro-Industrial owns 5 percent of 
CP Feedmill  (Weidenbaum  1996). CP Feedmill,  CP Northeastern,  and 
Bangkok Agro-Industrial are all listed on the Bangkok Stock Exchange. 
A second example is the Lippo group, controlled by  the Riady family. 
Lippo controls a financial conglomerate comprising three principal com- 
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Lippo Securities. Although the Riady family divested most of its equity 
stake in Lippo Bank and Lippo Life in 1996, it continues to control those 
companies through its majority stake in Lippo Securities, which holds 27 
percent of the shares in Lippo Life, which in turn holds 40  percent of 
Lippo Bank (Solomon 1996).  When the restructuring was proposed, many 
observers suspected that it was merely a means for the Riady family to 
extract assets from Lippo Life and Lippo Bank, and, as a result, there was 
some doubt as to whether it would be blocked by the shareholders or by 
the Indonesian stock market regulatory body (Solomon  1996). However, 
Lippo’s restructuring plans succeeded nonetheless, partly on the basis of 
a pledge by  the Riady family to reduce the group’s cross-holdings over 
time (“Nothing Can Hold Back Lippo” 1997). 
10.2  Agency Costs 
In this section, we  examine the agency costs associated with the CMS 
structure in three important contexts: choosing investment projects, select- 
ing investment policy and the scope of the firm, and choosing to transfer 
control. 
The CMS structure lacks the principal mechanisms that limit agency 
costs in other ownership structures. Unlike in DO structures, where control- 
ling management may have little equity but can be displaced, the control- 
lers of CMS companies face neither proxy contests nor hostile takeovers. 
Moreover, unlike  in  CS structures, where controlling shareholders are 
entrenched but  internalize  most  of  the value effects of  their  decisions 
through their shareholdings, CMS controllers may hold a very small frac- 
tion 01 of the cash-flow rights in their firms. In this section, we demonstrate 
that, as 01 declines, the controllers of CMS firms can externalize progres- 
sively more of the costs of their moral hazard and that the agency costs of 
CMS firms can increase at a sharply increasing rate as a result. Whether 
agency costs do  in fact increase at a sharply increasing rate thus depends on 
whether there are additional constraints on the decisions of CMS control- 
lers besides the tug of ownership structure and private benefits of control. 
10.2.1  Project Choice 
Consider first a controller’s choice of investment projects. Suppose that 
a firm has a choice of  investing in  one of two projects. Project X  will 
produce a total value  V,,  which includes cash flow  S,,  available to all 
shareholders, and private benefits of control B,,  available only to the firm’s 
controller. (B, may come from self-dealing or appropriating opportuni- 
ties.) Similarly, suppose that project Y will produce a total value of  V,, 
which includes the analogous terms S, and By.  Suppose further that proj- 
ect Y does not give rise to the same private opportunities to the controller, 
that is, that B, > B,.  The controller will choose project X if and only if 302  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George G. Triantis 
a(V, - B,)  +  B,  > a(VY - BY)  +  By. 
Thus, depending on a,  the controller might choose the project with the 
lower value  V but the larger private benefits of control B. Moreover, as a 
declines, the difference in value between Y and X will pale in importance 
in the controller’s eyes relative to the difference in the private benefits of 
control. This relation can be restated as follows: 
PROPOSITION  3. Given a less valuableproject X and a more vuluableproject 
Y,  a controller of  a CSMJirm  will make the ineficient decision to choose 
project X if  and only if 
V,  - V,  <(+)LIB, 
where AB = B, -  By > 0. 
Differentiating the term on the right with respect to a yields -(a-*)AB. 
This suggests that, for a given distribution of possible project Y’s, the like- 
lihood that the controller will inefficiently choose project X rises and the 
efficiency loss from such a selection rises at a sharply increasing rate, as 
a decreases. 
To take a concrete example, suppose that AB has the modest value of 
O.O3V,.  If a = 0.5, the distortion in project selection will be marginal: a 
controller will forgo the efficient project Y only if its excess value over X 
is less than 3  percent of  V,.  However, if  (Y  = 0.1, the distortion will be 
large-a  controller will reject the efficient project Y unless it exceeds  V, 
by more than 27 percent. 
10.2.2  Decisions on Scope 
Next, consider the agency costs associated with the controller’s decision 
to distribute cash flows or expand the firm under a CMS regime. Con- 
glomerates operating under a DO structure are frequently criticized  for 
inefficiently retaining free cash flows even when they lack profitable invest- 
ment opportunities. CMS structures are subject to a similar agency prob- 
lem when their controllers can extract private benefits from unprofitable 
projects. 
Agency costs can arise whenever a CMS controller is called on to decide 
whether to contract or expand the firm. To see this, suppose that there is 
an asset that produces value  which is the sum of cash flows S and pri- 
vate benefits B. If this asset belongs to a CMS firm, the firm’s controller 
may refuse to sell it and distribute the proceeds, P,  to all shareholders be- 
cause doing so would sacrifice a private benefit. Alternatively, if the asset is 
held by a third party, the CMS controller may cause his company to pay P 
for the asset, rather than distribute this sum as a dividend, in order to ac- 
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ler’s decision, these two situations are equivalent: in both, the controller’s 
incentives are distorted in favor of increasing the private benefits of con- 
trol by expanding the firm. 
More formally, a controller will prefer to expand (or not to contract) a 
firm if 
a(V - B)  +  B  > aP, 
where a  is again the fraction of cash-flow rights held by the firm’s control- 
ler. This point can be restated: 
PROPOSITION  4. A controller will prefer to expand the$rm  if  and only if 
V >  P - [e)B. 
Thus, if P  is in the range 
a controller will decide to make the enterprise inefficiently large. The mag- 
nitude of the inefficiency (P  - V)  is equal to (1 -  ala)B,  and the differen- 
tial with respect to a  is equal to -(w2)B.  Given any distribution of oppor- 
tunities to expand and contract, the likelihood that a CMS firm will make 
an inefficient decision (and thus the size of expected agency costs) grows 
larger as the controller’s equity stake a  grows smaller. As in the case of 
project choice, moreover, the potential agency costs increase at a sharply 
increasing rate as a declines. 
Consider, for example, a decrease in a  from ct  = 0.5 to a = 0.1. For 
a = 0.5, the range over which a controller will make inefficient decisions is 
(K V + B);  for a = 0.1, the range is ( K  V + 9B).  This is a very large dif- 
ference. Suppose that B is a modest 5 percent of K In this case, if a = 0.5, 
the controller will make mildly distorted decisions but will agree to sell 
the asset for a price that exceeds its value by  5 percent. However, for a = 
0.1, the controller  will refuse to sell the asset unless the firm receives a 
price 45 percent higher than the value of the asset to the firm. A reduction 
in a deteriorates incentives in two ways: (a)  it increases the number of in- 
efficient decisions, and (h)  the inefficient decisions added are especially bad. 
Thus, we  predict that CMS firms have a very strong tendency, all else 
equal, to expand rather than contract, to retain free cash flows, and to 
hold back distributions. It follows that CMS structures are more likely to 
evolve into conglomerates  than are either DO or CS structures,  unless 
their tendency to expand is contained by  governance mechanisms other 
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10.2.3  Control Transfers 
A third  set of  decisions that can impose  significant  agency costs on 
CMS firms is represented by transfers of control. Suppose that the initial 
controller, I, has a fraction a of the cash-flow rights. Under I, the firm’s 
value is V,,  which consists of cash flow S, and private control benefits B,. 
Under a potential new controller, N, the corresponding values would be 
V,, S,, and B,.  A transfer of control to N will be efficient if and only if 
V, = S, + B, < V, = S,  + B,.  However, if  CY is small, the decision of 
controller I to sell the firm will depend much less on V,  and V,, the values 
of the firm in the hands of 1 and N, than on the relative sizes of B, and B,, 
the private benefits of I and N. To demonstrate this point clearly, we must 
first specify the nature of the legal regime governing control transfers. 
CMS Control Transfers under the Market Rule 
Bebchuk  (1994) has previously  identified  two  paradigmatic  legal  re- 
gimes governing control transactions: the “market rule,” under which the 
transferor  of control (in our case, I) may retain a control premium, and 
the  “equal opportunity  rule,”  under  which noncontrolling  shareholders 
are entitled to participate in a transfer of control on the same terms as the 
controller.  Consider  first  how  transfers  of  control  over  CMS firms are 
likely to be affected by the size of 01  under the market rule. 
Under the market rule, it can be shown (see Bebchuk 1994) that control 
will be transferred if and only if 
as, +  B,  > as,  +  B,. 
The intuition is that the value of a control block of shares in a company 
is aS + B, which is the controller’s fractional claim on the company’s cash 
flows plus the private benefit of control. It follows that, when the above 
condition holds, the control block will be worth more to N than to I. Since 
V, = S, + B, and VN = S, + V,,  we can rearrange the above relation to 
establish that, even if  V,  > V,, control will be transferred as long as 
Conversely, even if  V, > V,,  control will not be transferred as long as 
In the first case, transfer of control is inefficient; in the second, failure to 
transfer control is inefficient. In both cases, moreover, it is clear that the 
magnitude of the inefficiency costs as well as the range of inefficient out- 
comes increase exponentially as 01  declines. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity  305 
CMS Control Transfers under the Equal Opportunity Rule 
trol stake if and only if 
Under the equal opportunity rule, an initial controller will sell her con- 
as, +  B,  <  aV,, 
that is, when the sum of her cash-flow rights and private benefits is less 
than the proportionate share of the firm’s total value acquired by the new 
controller. Rearranging terms, a sale will not take place if and only if 
a 
B,  < -  (‘N  -  1- a 
even if  VN  > V,. Thus, as a/(l -  a)  declines (and it declines much faster 
than a),  the equal opportunity rule blocks a wider range of efficient trans- 
actions. Indeed, when the initial controller enjoys significant private ben- 
efits, even transfers with large potential efficiency gains are unlikely to 
occur. Consider the example of a pyramid in which B, = 0.501 V,  and a = 
0.2. In this case, a transfer will not occur even if  V, is twice the size of V,. 
10.2.4  Factors Limiting the Agency Costs of CMS Structures 
The discussion of agency costs thus far has implicitly assumed that a 
CMS controller has no significant constraints on her ability to extract 
private  benefits. In  fact, however, there  are at least  two potential  con- 
straints that may limit CMS agency costs and protect the interests of non- 
controlling shareholders. 
Reputation as a Constraint on Agency Costs 
The first potential constraint  on agency costs is reputation. The fact 
that CMS structures can impose significant agency costs is well known, 
even if the magnitude of these costs is not. It follows that CMS controllers 
who return to the equity market must pay a price for the expected agency 
cost of CMS structures unless they can establish a reputation for sound 
management. 
There is some evidence that reputational concerns constrain CMS con- 
trollers. On one hand, a good reputation appears to facilitate CMS struc- 
tures. For example, Barr, Gerson, and Kantor (1997) find that South Afri- 
can controlling  shareholders with  better  reputations  tend  to maintain 
smaller stakes in CMS firms. Conversely, a reputation for exploiting mi- 
nority shareholders sharply increases the cost of capital for a CMS firm. 
Thus, after the Russian firm Menatep was accused of stripping profits 
from the subsidiaries of A0  Yukos, a closely held oil company that it con- 
trols, its acquisition of another oil company (Eastern Oil) raised new fears 
of asset stripping and sharply decreased the share price of Eastern’s sub- 
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A further clue about the role of reputation in controlling agency costs 
is that families-frequently  regarded as repositories for reputation-are 
the most common controlling shareholders in CMS structures (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer  1999). Since family pyramids  and cross- 
holding structures tend to grow gradually through the generation of inter- 
nal capital and the issuance of minority  stock, one might expect family 
controllers to limit their appropriation  of private benefits in order to as- 
sure continued growth for the benefit of their offspring. Moreover, the pres- 
sure on CMS controllers to maintain a good reputation appears to have 
increased in countries such as Sweden and South Africa that have recently 
reduced barriers to the inflow of foreign investment  capital (“Storming 
the Citadel” 1990; Barr, Gerson, and Kantor 1997). 
Legal Construints on Agency Costs 
A second potential constraint on CMS agency costs is the legal protec- 
tions accorded minority  shareholders. The analysis of this part has sug- 
gested that the agency costs of CMS structures tend to grow as the private 
benefits of control increase. Thus, the agency costs of CMS structures will 
tend to be comparatively larger in countries in which legal rules are lax 
and private benefits of control are consequently large. 
Note that this point presents a puzzle. It might suggest that CMS struc- 
tures will tend to be less common in countries with a lax corporate law 
system. Yet the opposite seems to be the case: CMS structures are in fact 
more common in countries with a lax corporate law system. We  will re- 
mark on how this puzzle might be explained in section 10.4 below. 
10.3  Comparison with a Leveraged CS Structure 
In the broader capital structure decision, cash flows are divided not only 
among shareholders but also between shareholders and debtholders. Thus, 
control may  be  separated  from cash-flow rights,  not only  by  allocating 
control rights to minority shareholders, but also by taking on substantial 
debt. In what we term a leveraged controlling-shareholder (LCS) structure, 
the controller holds most or all of the equity tickets with their attached 
control rights, but most of the firm’s cash flow must be paid out to debt- 
holders. Debt investors are typically nonvoting stakeholders, and, in this 
limited sense, they resemble minority shareholders. The comparison is re- 
flected in the contrast between the means by which two of the most promi- 
nent business families in Canada secured control over large empires. The 
Reichmanns financed their Olympia and York through private and public 
debt; the Bronfmans drew more on equity investment to build the Hees- 
Edper-Brascan web of interlocking companies. 
Despite  the superficial similarity  between  CMS and LSC structures, 
however, two important differences suggest that these structures have a Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity  307 
qualitatively different range of agency costs. These distinctions turn on the 
priority rights and the covenant protections enjoyed by debtholders. 
10.3.1 
The fact that debtholders generally enjoy a fixed entitlement with prior- 
ity over the claims of shareholders alters the nature of the agency problem. 
Take as an example the effect of leveraging on project choice-the  prob- 
lem analyzed in the CMS context in section 10.2.1 above. Suppose that a 
firm’s controller owns all its equity and issues debt with face value D.  In 
the simple case in which there is no probability of insolvency, no agency 
costs arise under this LCS structure because the controlling shareholder, 
as residual claimant, internalizes all the costs and benefits of her decisions. 
But, if  there is a significant probability  of insolvency, the problem  is 
more complex. Assume for the moment that the probability of insolvency 
is a function of the amount of debt, D,  but not of the choice between the 
projects: that is, P(V, < D)  = P(V, < D) = IT  for projects X and Y. 
Assume also that the controller can extract private benefits before the firm 
becomes insolvent. The controller would choose project X if and only if 
The Priority Rights of Debt 
(1 - IT)(V,  - D - B,)  +  B,  > (1 - IT)(& - D - By)  +  By. 
If we  let AB = B, -  By,  the controller will make an inefficient decision 
to choose project X over project Y if and only if 
0  <  V, - V,  <   IT/(^ - IT)]AB. 
Differentiating the right side with respect to IT  gives us (1 -  IT)-~AB. 
This result suggests that agency costs are as sensitive to the probability 
of insolvency in LCS firms (which increases with leverage) as they are to 
a  in the CMS case. Like a, 1 -  IT  represents the degree to which the con- 
troller can externalize the costs of appropriating private benefits through 
the selection  of projects-or,  by extension, through  distribution policy. 
And, just as it appears to be in the interest of a CMS controller to reduce 
a  as much as possible, it may seem to be in the interest of a LCS controller 
to minimize 1 -  IT  by issuing as much debt as possible. 
Yet the LCS controller’s preference for project X is more complex if we 
relax one or both of the assumptions of (a) the independence of insolvency 
risk from project choice and (b)  the priority of private benefits over debt 
claims. After relaxing these assumptions, we must reexamine the effect of 
insolvency risk on a controller’s variable interest (her residual claim as a 
shareholder) and her fixed interest (her “claim” on private benefits of con- 
trol). 
If we relax the assumption that IT  is independent of the project selected, 
project choice is tilted in a manner that is well known as the agency prob- 
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troller, will come to prefer more to less risky projects. This may compound 
or offset the distortion  described  above. In particular,  if  the inefficient 
project X is also the riskier project, the controller will be even more favor- 
ably inclined toward it. If, conversely, the efficient project Y is the riskier 
project, the controller’s incentive  to choose project X may be tempered 
somewhat by the attractiveness of the riskiness of project Y to the control- 
ler qua shareholder. 
However, to the extent that we  also relax the second assumption that 
the controller  appropriates private  benefits  prior  to insolvency, benefits 
effectively become subordinate in priority to the claims of the debtholders. 
If  project  X is the riskier  choice,  its expected private benefits must  be 
discounted by the probability of insolvency and may turn out to be lower 
than the expected benefits of project Y.  If, however, project Y is the riskier 
choice, the controller’s expected private benefits are even more favorable 
to project X than in the simple case demonstrated above, and this offsets 
the benefit to the controller (qua shareholder) from risk taking. In sum, 
the most severe agency problem arises when project X is the riskier alter- 
native and the controller can take her private  benefits before insolvency 
occurs. If  either project X is the less risky alternative or the controller’s 
private benefits are threatened  by  insolvency, then the inefficiency of the 
controller’s incentives (in favor of projects that are either risky or yield 
large private benefits) may be modest and is almost certainly less than the 
controller’s counterpart in the CMS firm. 
Indeed, an LCS controller’s incentive qua shareholder to prefer  risky 
projects and high leverage is easily overstated. The interest of equityhold- 
ers in a leveraged firm is often summarized in corporate finance by observ- 
ing that they effectively hold a call option: they have the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy the firm’s assets by paying off the firm’s indebtedness. 
Since the value of a call option is an increasing function of the riskiness 
of the underlying asset, it follows that raising the riskiness of a firm’s assets 
can increase its share value. This conventional account, however, neglects 
the fact that option values are a function of the time to maturity as well 
as volatility. In the case of traded financial options, an increase in the risk 
of the underlying asset does not change the maturity of the option. But, 
in the case of the leveraged firm, the maturity of the shareholder’s option 
is the firm’s default on its debt obligations, which in turn may be acceler- 
ated by an increase in the riskiness of the firm’s projects. Therefore, an 
LCS controller’s incentive to enhance her option value by  increasing the 
riskiness of the firm is at least partially offset by the resulting abbreviation 
of the expected life of the option. 
The incentive to make distributions  to shareholders (e.g., dividends, 
share repurchases) is more straightforward. The CMS controller receives 
only a fraction of the corporate distributions but extracts the full private 
benefit from assets left in the firm. In contrast, the LCS controller receives 
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subject to the risk of losing them in the event of insolvency. Therefore, the 
incentive to distribute is much higher in the LCS case. While CMS firms 
may grow inefficiently large, LCS firms may shrink inefficiently small, at 
least if distributions to shareholders are unconstrained. 
Finally, controllers of CMS and LCS firms also differ with respect to 
sales of their controlling stakes. Where a CMS controller may refuse an 
efficient sale or accept an inefficient one, depending on the legal regime, a 
LCS controller will always deal with a higher-valuing purchaser. The rea- 
son is that all potential purchasers of the equity in an LCS firm can extract 
the same value from creditors by leveraging. Moreover, all returns to LCS 
shareholders with 100 percent of the equity in their firms are shareholder 
returns, whether they are paid out as dividends or as perks. Thus, there is 
no danger that differences in private returns will deter the sale of  LCS 
equity. Any purchaser who values the equity of a leveraged firm more than 
the incumbent controlling shareholder should be able to buy it. 
10.3.2  The Contractual Protection of Creditors 
The second important distinction between the governance of CMS and 
LCS structures is that creditors typically enjoy far-reaching contractual 
safeguards in addition to their priority rights. The shareholder’s control 
of a LCS firm is contingent on satisfying the conditions and promises 
contained in the contract between the firm and its debtholders. For ex- 
ample, where the controllers of firms might otherwise reinvest free cash 
flows to increase their private control benefits, they are legally bound to 
make interest payments to their debtholders. This constrains their ability 
to take private-control benefits (see Jensen 1986). Moreover, given their 
enforcement rights, debtholders generally contract for a much richer set 
of protections than minority shareholders do. That is, a leveraged firm 
must promise to observe numerous constraints and forgo specific forms 
of misbehavior, and, all else equal, these restrictions become more severe 
as the firm becomes more leveraged. The sanction for breach, moreover, 
is the acceleration of the debt and the exercise of creditor rights against 
firm assets, which exposes the controller of an LCS firm to the risk of re- 
moval. 
One indication of the importance of contractual protections in reducing 
the agency costs of debt is the paucity in the United States of preferred 
stock without conversion or redemption rights (see Houston and Houston 
1990, 45). Such stock resembles debt with particularly weak contractual 
protection. 
10.3.3 
Given that corporate debtholders generally impose detailed contractual 
restrictions on controlling shareholders-and  given that debt creates in- 
centives different from, and sometimes opposed to, those that arise under 
CMS structures-leverage  might serve as a commitment device for CMS 
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controllers who wish to refrain from exploiting their opportunities to take 
private benefits. Thus, debt financing can limit controller latitude to invest 
in negative net-present-value  projects by  forcing firms to distribute free 
cash to investors (Jensen 1986). Moreover, a skilled creditor-monitor, such 
as a bank, enhances the discipline of debt: to some extent, such a monitor 
can confer a public good on all corporate stakeholders by  deterring the 
inefficient appropriation of private-control benefits by a firm’s controller. 
Therefore, we  might predict that sophisticated shareholders would prefer 
to invest in leveraged CMS firms, especially if a significant debt were con- 
centrated in the hands of a skilled monitor, such as a bank. 
Yet whether CMS controllers actually use the LCS structure as a com- 
mitment device is an open question. As we have discussed in this section, 
the incentives of lenders also diverge from those of noncontrolling share- 
holders, and the latter group cannot count on the former to protect  its 
interests. Moreover, the discipline of monitoring by lenders is easily frus- 
trated by the managerial, investment, and political links between firms and 
institutional lenders that are common in countries with CMS structures. 
Commentators have noted the inadequate supervision of lending relation- 
ships among connected parties within family or business groups in many 
of the troubled Asian economies (e.g., South Korea). Even in the more 
developed economies, conglomerate borrowers may attract less than rigor- 
ous screening and monitoring from their institutional lenders than smaller, 
stand-alone firms.) 
10.4  Concluding Remarks: An Agenda for Research 
We have sought to attract attention in this paper to the incentive prob- 
lems of CMS structures. CMS firms deserve close scrutiny because they 
are pervasive outside the handful of developed countries with highly de- 
veloped equity markets and a tradition of dispersed-share ownership. Our 
principal contribution here has been to analyze their agency costs. In par- 
ticular, CMS structures can distort the incentives of corporate controllers 
to make efficient decisions with respect to project selection, firm size, and 
roles of control. We  have demonstrated  that, all else equal, the agency 
costs associated with CMS firms increase very rapidly as the fraction of 
equity cash-flow rights held by  CMS controllers declines. Moreover, al- 
though  the agency costs of CMS structures resemble  in  some respects 
those of debt, they are not limited by the contractual protections and incen- 
tive characteristics that constrain the opportunism  of controlling equity- 
3. Daniels and Maclntosh (1991, 885) suggest that, in Canada, “institutional shareholders, 
like banks, insurance and trust companies, may justifiably fear loss of business or loss of 
access to preferential information flows should they oppose wealth-reducing management 
initiatives.” Sweden’s biggest commercial bank has been viewed as the Wallenberg bank even 
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holders in leveraged firms. Thus, CMS agency costs can bulk even larger 
than those of highly leveraged LCS firms. 
Our analytic conclusions in  this paper, however, are only a first step 
in the investigation of CMS firms. Our discussion suggests a number of 
additional questions that together constitute an agenda for research on 
these structures. 
10.4.1 
We  have shown that CMS structures can assume the three principal 
forms of dual class share issues, pyramids, and cross-shareholding struc- 
tures. Of these, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) find that py- 
ramid structures are the most common. An obvious but important ques- 
tion is, What factors determine the choice by  controllers among CMS 
forms? Contributing factors are likely to include transaction costs, legal 
restrictions (e.g., on the use of multiclass equity), and political and reputa- 
tional constraints (encourage more opaque structures of cross-ownership). 
Although we have shown that any of the mechanisms alone or in combina- 
tion can reduce a  to almost zero, the evidence suggests that controllers 
refrain from exploiting fully this potential. This question may also be ad- 
dressed by  examining the economic, legal, and political factors limiting 
the use of the various mechanisms. 
Understanding the Choice among Alternative CMS Structures 
10.4.2 
Given the magnitude of the potential agency costs associated with CMS 
structures, a second important question concerns the actuaZ costs associ- 
ated with these firms. These costs turn on how far legal protections and 
reputational considerations limit the opportunism of CMS controllers: for 
example, the extent to which agency costs are reduced by borrowing heav- 
ily  from sophisticated monitors such as banks. The magnitude of CMS 
agency costs bears importantly on understanding the incidence and conse- 
quences of CMS structures. Some important empirical work in this direc- 
tion is already under way. Holmen and Hogfeldt (1999) put forward find- 
ings on agency costs in Swedish pyramids, and Bianco (1998) presents 
findings on such costs in Italian pyramids. Claessens et al. (1999) docu- 
ment that firms in a pyramid structure have lower Q-values than similar 
stand-alone firms. 
Empirically Investigating the Agency Costs of CMS Structures 
10.4.3 
Our results indicating  the large size of potential  agency costs under 
CMS structures suggest a puzzle that calls for an explanation. What ex- 
plains  the common existence of  these  structures notwithstanding  their 
large agency costs? 
One line of research in search of an answer to this puzzle might be to 
search for countervailing efficiency benefits associated with CMS struc- 
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tures that offset their agency costs (see Khanna and Palepu 1999,2000, in 
press).  Such factors, if  they could be identified,  might naturally  explain 
the existence  of  CMS structures.  One thing  that  makes  this  approach 
difficult is that CMS structures are common in countries with lax corpo- 
rate rules, even though the agency costs of such structures tend to be larger 
in such countries. This implies that, to be able to explain the observed 
patterns of ownership, the considered line of research would have to iden- 
tify some countervailing  efficiency benefits that are likely to be large in 
countries with lax rules. 
Bebchuk (1 999a, 1999b) develops an alternative approach to explaining 
why  CMS structures arise. These papers suggest that, even when CMS 
structures do not have redeeming efficiency benefits, they might nonethe- 
less arise when private benefits of control are large. 
Bebchuk  (1999b) analyzes how  the initial  owner  of  a company  who 
takes it public decides whether to create a structure in which he will main- 
tain a lock on corporate control. This decision is shown to depend heavily 
on the  size of the private  benefits  of  control.  When  these  benefits  are 
large-and  when control is thus valuable enough-leaving  control up for 
grabs invites attempts to seize control. In such circumstances, an initial 
owner might elect to maintain a lock on control to prevent rivals from 
attempting to grab it merely to gain the private benefits of control. Fur- 
thermore, when private benefits of control are large, choosing a control- 
ling-shareholder structure would enable the company’s initial shareholders 
to capture a larger fraction of the surplus from value-producing transfers 
of control. Both results suggest that, in countries in which lax legal rules 
allow large private benefits of control, corporate founders will elect to re- 
tain a lock on control when taking their companies public. And, if these 
founders prefer to hold just a limited fraction of the cash-flow rights to 
avoid risk or conserve funds, they will look to CMS structures to lock in 
their control. 
Bebchuk (1999a) adds an additional element to the explanation by mod- 
eling choices of ownership structure made after the initial public offering 
stage. Following an initial public offering, companies  will  often  have a 
controlling shareholder who must decide whether to retain its initial lock 
on control when the company must raise new outside capital. This deci- 
sion, which shapes the ultimate structure of publicly traded companies in 
the economy, is again shown to be very much influenced by the levels of 
private benefits of control. When the corporate law system is lax and pri- 
vate benefits of control are consequently large, controlling shareholders 
will be more reluctant to relinquish  their grip on control. Consequently, 
they  will be more likely to raise  additional capital by  selling cash-flow 
rights without voting rights-that  is, by creating an CMS structure-even 
if this structure would impose larger tax and agency costs. The reason is 
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from forgoing his lock on control, the efficiency gains from eschewing a 
CMS structure would be partly  shared by  the existing public investors. 
Consequently, in countries in which private benefits of  control are large, 
controllers seeking extra capital for their publicly traded companies will 
have a strong incentive to sell cash-flow rights with no or disproportion- 
ately small voting rights4 
Note that the two explanations described above are complementary in 
that they both suggest that CMS structures will  arise when the level of 
private benefits of control is large. These explanations sit well  with the 
observed patterns of ownership around the world. Many of the examples 
of well-known CMS structures that we have noted are from countries that 
seem to be characterized  by  relatively large private benefits of control. 
These explanations are also consistent with  the findings of  La  Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1 999), who observe that CMS structures 
are more common in countries where the legal protection of investors, as 
measured by their index, is low. Finally, these explanations are consistent 
with the results of Claessens et  al. (1999), who find that pyramids  are 
common in Asian countries with little investor protection and, within any 
given country, in lines of business in which private benefits are large. 
10.4.4  Public Policy toward CMS Structures 
Finally, there  is  a  question  of  how-and  whether-CMS  structures 
should be regulated. CMS structures have come under increasing political 
and market pressure in recent years. For example, in May 1997, Taiwan’s 
legislature passed a law  on connected enterprises that mandates disclo- 
sures of cross-holding or pyramid linkages. Last year, a new companies 
bill was introduced in India that contains a provision stipulating that hold- 
ing companies cannot be subsidiaries: parents of existing subsidiary hold- 
ing companies would either have to dilute their stake or have to dissolve 
them.  In  South Africa,  there  has  been  unbundling  of  conglomerates, 
partly under economic and political pressure to foster the emergence of 
black-controlled  business.  At  the  same  time,  pyramid  structures  are 
viewed as the means by  which black business groups can control busi- 
nesses. In Sweden, the Wallenberg family is selectively increasing its stakes 
in some firms and divesting itself of its stake in others, apparently in order 
to attract foreign capital (“Whither the Wallenbergs?” 1993). In Canada, 
the privatizing and consolidation of entities in the Hees-Edper-Brascan 
group  since  1993 have  significantly simplified  its  corporate  structure. 
These transactions have collapsed cross-holdings and eliminated public 
4. Wolfenzon (1999) develops an explanation of why pyramids arise that is also based on 
post-initial  public offering decisions. In his model, controllers resort to a pyramid in order 
to make an additional investment that would increase their private benefits but would have 
a negative effect on cash flows. Note that, unlike the model in Bebchuk (1999a), this model 
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companies, apparently in response to investor demands in the early 1990s 
(“Bronfman Companies” 1993). 
A continuing investigation of the agency costs and efficiency character- 
istics of  CSM structures clearly bears on how we  evaluate the incipient 
pressures worldwide to dismantle these structures. On one hand, the case 
for regulation is made if the agency costs of these structures are large and 
there is strong evidence of a divergence between private and social benefits 
in their creation. In this case, the only issue is how to regulate: for example, 
by  explicit prohibitions  such as a one-share one-vote rule and a ban on 
pyramiding or by tax policies such as intercorporate income taxation  to 
discourage pyramids. On the other hand, if further research shows signifi- 
cant constraints  on the agency costs of  CMS firms and important off- 
setting efficiencies, then it is the pressures to unravel these structures that 
deserve closer scrutiny. 
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Comment  Dennis P.  Sheehan 
The paper by Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis focuses our attention on 
a known issue but one that has been little considered. They discuss the 
many ways in which a shareholder can separate cash-flow rights from con- 
trol rights. The object of such separation of course is to control the firm 
while bearing little of the wealth consequences of decisions made as the 
controller. 
The three devices that are commonly employed  are dual class shares, 
pyramids,  and cross-ownership.  The authors analyze each of these  and 
demonstrate how a controlling-minority shareholder (CMS) can use them 
to extract private benefits. More specifically, the authors show that project 
choice, firm size and scope, and control transfers are all likely to be af- 
fected by the separation of control rights from wealth consequences. 
One of the important points that the authors make is that the agency 
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costs imposed by  CMS structures can be highly nonlinear in ownership. 
Controlling-minority  shareholders always get the full value of any private 
benefits that they extract from the firm. But, when they own a significant 
fraction of the firm, they also bear the consequences of any loss in firm 
value. As the proportion  of cash-flow rights decreases to an arbitrarily 
small amount, the wealth consequences of extracting private benefits tilt 
dramatically  in their  favor even if  much firm value  is destroyed  in  the 
process. 
In sum, CMS structures represent an extreme case where it appears that 
there are no disciplining forces either inside or outside the firm. What, 
then, prevents these shareholders from looting the firm? The authors iden- 
tify two constraints on the behavior of controlling-minority shareholders. 
First, reputation may limit the behavior of controlling shareholders. Con- 
trolling shareholders who need to take any of their firms back to the capi- 
tal markets must take some care to develop a reputation for treating mi- 
nority claimholders fairly. Second, the legal system may accord rights to 
minority shareholders that a controlling shareholder cannot ignore. Coun- 
tries clearly differ dramatically in the extent of this protection, as La Porta 
et al. (1999) document. 
Having absorbed the mechanics of the paper, it is immediately apparent 
that it presents us with several conundrums. If CMS structures are poten- 
tially so costly, why do they appear to be so common? Why are they most 
common in precisely those countries that seem to afford minority share- 
holders the least protection? And, perhaps the most interesting one of all, 
given how abusive CMS structures can be, why would anyone voluntarily 
be a minority shareholder? 
The authors are certainly aware of these issues and, in fact, conclude 
their paper with  a suggested  research  agenda  that would  answer them. 
One of the privileges of a discussant is “to boldly go where no man has 
gone before.” That privilege allows me to speculate about answers without 
having to worry about the prospect of doing the actual work. 
One possibility is that, although agency costs of CMS structures can be 
large in principle, they are small in practice. A hint of that is contained in 
the puzzle that controlling shareholders usually do not “go all the way.” 
In the work that Cliff Holderness and I have done on majority sharehold- 
ers (see Holderness and Sheehan  1988), one of the results that surprised 
us is that majority shareholders often hold significantly more than is nec- 
essary to maintain control. Instead of holding their stakes at exactly 50.1 
percent, they will often hold 60, 70, or 80 percent of the common stock. 
Although the reasons for doing so remain unclear, it is apparent that ma- 
jority shareholders cannot be motivated solely or even mostly by a desire 
to expropriate the minority shareholders. 
Indeed, one of the surprising things  about majority  shareholders  (at 
least in the United States) is that it is difficult to find very much evidence Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity  317 
that they do exploit their position to the detriment of minority sharehold- 
ers. This is not to say that it never occurs, as it is easy to find specific 
examples of abuse (see Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff 1993). But system- 
atic evidence of widespread abuse is difficult to find in the data. 
Similarly, there is not much evidence that dual class share firms are bad 
for minority shareholders. Results in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and 
Partch (1 987) support efficiency explanations for dual class firms. Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1988) do find negative wealth effects when firm adopt dual 
class shares, but they are small in magnitude. Lehn, Netter, and Poulsen 
(1990) investigate why firms would choose a dual class recapitalization as 
opposed to a leveraged buyout (LBO). Both concentrate ownership, but 
they differ in their wealth effects, with LBOs increasing the wealth effect 
on owners and dual class recaps decreasing it. The authors, however, find 
that firms using the two  approaches differ in their characteristics,  thus 
favoring an efficiency explanation. Finally, Field and Karpoff (1999) inves- 
tigate firms going public with  antitakeover  provisions,  among which is 
dual class shares. Although the dual class arrangement could be viewed 
as a device for retaining the flow of private benefits, the fact remains that 
new shareholders willingly buy into firms in which wealth consequences 
are not proportional to voting rights. It seems likely that these new share- 
holders buy into these firms at prices that  protect them from being ex- 
ploited. 
Here is one more (small) piece of evidence on CMS structures. A firm 
that regularly gets touted as the prototype for a new form of corporate 
structure is Thermo Electron, which has turned pyramiding into an art. 
Thermo has spun off some twenty five “children” or “grandchildren” and 
generally retains an ownership stake that is sufficient to control its off- 
spring. Despite the potential for the parent corporation to abuse the off- 
spring, the data suggest exactly the opposite. Thermo Electron sells at a 
significant  discount  to the value  of its holdings  in the carve-outs,  sug- 
gesting that the subsidy flows from the controlling shareholder to the mi- 
nority shareholders. 
One explanation for some of these results is the protection afforded mi- 
nority shareholders by the legal system in the United States, chiefly the 
common law tradition. Perhaps this explains why we observe relatively few 
CMS firms in the United States. That is, in the United  States, minority 
shareholders  can prevent  controlling  shareholders  from  extracting  too 
many private  benefits, so structures that are conducive to the extraction 
of private benefits are not worth the trouble. 
Still, the legal system in the United States cannot explain why control- 
ling shareholders are not as aggressive as they might be with their owner- 
ship structures or why  Thermo Electron’s discount has the wrong  sign. 
And, certainly, the features of the U.S. legal system cannot explain what 
happens in other countries, which is where CMS structures seem so preva- 318  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George G. Triantis 
lent. Like most economists, I am partial to efficiency explanations. Look- 
ing at the frequency of CMS structures in other parts of the world, it is 
hard not to be struck by the fact that they seem to flourish in countries 
where capital markets and legal systems are not as developed as they are 
in the United States. 
Several explanations spring to mind. If it is difficult for entrepreneurs 
to raise funds, the only way  to extend a business  may be to leverage a 
small stake using devices such  as pyramids  or dual class shares. Or, if 
markets tend not to be liquid, holding a large stake in any firm is not ad- 
visable, so, again, leveraging a small stake is the best strategy. If the legal 
system is not hospitable to claimholders’ rights, perhaps one way to pro- 
tect yourself is to be the controlling shareholder, assuming that you have 
the financial wherewithal. Indeed, in an interesting twist, Gomes (1999) 
shows that controlling  shareholder  structures might  even beneficial!  If 
the controlling shareholder cares about his reputation because of possible 
future sales of stock, dual class and pyramidal  structures allow more of 
those future sales without losing control of the firm. 
With speculation piled on speculation here, it is clear that the only an- 
swer is empirical work that will answer the puzzles posed by the authors. 
I am sure that the authors and I agree on this point. I will also bet that we 
could agree on  another point: we  hope that  someone  else will  do the 
grubby work of data collection necessary to answer all these questions! 
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